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problems which experienced and disinterested judges are better qualified to
solve than anyone else. This does not mean that the courts should have the
power to devise a plan of its own, but only the power to pass upon the
fairness of the plan, and, if reasonable, to accept it. The courts might be
given a slight power of amendment, but it can be argued that if a plan were
amended under such power it should be submitted and passed upon by
the majority.
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT
JOSEPH HEFFERNAN*
. . the supreme power cannot take away from any
man any part of his property without his consent."-John
Locke (1690).'
"Upon such confirmation . . . the plan and . . .
the order . . . shall be binding upon . . . all stock-
holders . . . including those who have not, as well as
those who have, accepted it, and . . . upon all creditors,
secured or unsecured . . . including those who have not,
as well as those who have accepted it." U. S. Bankruptcy Act,
Sec. 77B(g) (1934).2
This paper will discuss the justifiability of this subsection of the cor-
porate reorganization provisions of the bankruptcy act. Under the Ameri-
can scheme of government this means a consideration of the constitutionality
of the legislation. It might be regarded as significant that a lawyer should
begin a discussion of the subject by quoting "what a dead hand wrote"
nearly two hundred and fifty years ago. The answer is that the hand
is not yet dead. When the corporate reorganization provisions of the bank-
ruptcy act (Sec. 77B) were proposed in Congress and the hearings held in
committee upon the bill, names prominent in the legal profession came
forward to protest its unconstitutionality. 3 Their objections were two. It
* Of the Washington (Ind.) Bar. Research fellow, Columbia Law School.
1 "An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Govern-
ment," (1690), (Everyman Ed., p. 187). As a statement of Locke's precise position,
it is conceded that this quotation is out of context and misleading. In fact it is
fairly inferable from this same essay that Locke held that the consent in question
could be given by a majority, either in person or through their duly chosen
representatives. In any event, Locke was really undertaking nothing more
ambitious in this essay than the refutation of the doctrine of absolute monarchy,
and to justify the English Revolution of 1688. But his words have been taken
over by the generations which followed him and used to justify absolute concepts
of property rights. The course of this flow of ideas has been traced. Hamilton:
Property According to Locke, 41 Yale L. J. 864 (1932).
248 Stat. 911, 11 U. S. C. A. Sec. 207(g). Approved June 7, 1934.
3 Among these are: Morford: Federal Legislation for Corporate Reorganiza-
tion: A Negative View, 19 A. B. A. J. 702 (December, 1933). Stebbins: Constitu-
tionality of Recent Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, 17 Marquette L. R. 173
(April, 1933). Special Committee on Bankruptcy, Bar Assn. of St. Louis Joint
Hearings Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 72nd
Congress, 1st Session on S. 3866, at page 525. Josiah Marvel, Jr., ibid., at page
568. Harold Remington (author of Remington on Bankruptcy), ibid. at page 795.
Edwin C. Brandenburg (author of Brandenburg on Bankruptcy), ibid. at page
945. Kenneth Dayton, Counsel to the Chamber of Commerce of the State of
New York, ibid. at page 202.
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is not bankruptcy legislation. And (even if it were so regarded), no
security holder of a corporation may be required, without his consent, to
accept satisfaction of his interest in the debtor's property in other than
legal tender. He has a constitutional right to insist upon sale of the cor-
porate assets and distribution to him in cash of his pro rata share. Unani-
mous consent of all security holders is required to effect reorganization
without such a sale.
During the last fifty years the reorganization of corporations in this
country has been effected chiefly by the instrumentality of equity receiver-
ship. The system was scandalously expensive, and the tragic dissipation of
the efficiency of a going concern. No one questioned that. It was abolished
as to railroad corporations in England as long ago as 1867, and for most
other companies therein 1908.4  But the system remained here. In spite
of the frightful economic scar which each reorganization left, it was gener-
ally thought that no citizen could be constitutionally forced, without his
consent, to accept securities in the reorganized company to the exclusion of
his ancient right to force a sale and partake of its proceeds.
I assume that no apology is needed today for an interpretation of such
a phenomenon in terms of a philosophy which would seem to account for
its being. It has come to be realized that a philosophy of values lies behind
any view one may hold upon the justifiability of a given type of legislation
or judicial action. A legal analysis of a theory of unconstitutionality would
therefore be inadequate which did not discern the value judgment which
conditions the existence of the doctrine of unconstitutionality in question.
In the instance before us it seems apparent that the philosophy of John
Locke as interpreted by his disciples has been read into the constitutional
provisions which are assumed to strike down the corporate reorganization
section of the bankruptcy act. The security holder's contract right to insist
upon sale as provided in the bond is a property right. He cannot be de-
prived of that right without his consent. Even if he is in a minority of
one. The Act of Congress which provides machinery for a plan that may
proceed without his consent, deprives him of that property without due
process of law.
Section 77B of the bankruptcy act defies this theory. In doing so the
value judgment behind the doctrine which is rejected has necessarily been
displaced by a different philosophy of values. No preamble to the amend-
ing section is present to make explicit the social or economic interest which
was regarded as dominant. This paper will endeavor to discover one in its
general intent, and to show that the choice of values which was made was
abundantly reasonable from the standpoint of due process of law.
Is Section 77B Bankruptcy Legislation?5
The amending section has been said not to be upon the subject of bank-
ruptcies (1) because it does not provide for a sale and immediate distribu-
tion of the bankrupt's property among its creditors; (2) because it is legis-
lation for the relief of "debtors" who need not be "insolvent," whereas
4 Railway Companies Act (1867), 30 and 31 Vict., c. 126-127. Companies
Consolidation Act (1908).
5 A knowledge of the provisions of Section 77B on the part of the reader is
assumed. The section has been fully analyzed, among others, by Weiner: Cor-
porate Reorganization: Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 34 Col. L. R. 1173(1934); Friendly: Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act, 48
Harvard L. R. 39 (1934); Kaplan: Corporate Reorganization Under Section 77B
of the *Bankruptcy Act, 33 Mich. L. R. 77 (1934). For one not acquainted with
the amendment, the following summary of those provisions of Section 77B
considered within the scope of this article, will be helpful.
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bankruptcy --may deal only with "insolvents"; (3) because it provides ma-
chinery for the adjustment of the rights of shareholders among themselves,
whereas bankruptcy may deal only with the creditor-insolvent debtor rela-
tion; (4) because it deals with secured creditors, which no bankruptcy law
has ever done before. These are the views of Morford and Stebbins.8
The latter in a ten page article nowhere defines his concept of "insolvent".
It is evident, however, that he as well as Mr. Morford, has in mind the
present bankruptcy law definition-excess of liabilities over assets at fair
valuation. This definition they read into the constitution. And they ask
whether Sec. 77B complies with it. That section authorizes a corporation
which is unable to meet its debts as they mature, and which may not there-
fore be insolvent in the present bankruptcy law sense, to be recognized in
bankruptcy. Because this provision involves a definition of bankruptcy
which does not fit into their antecedent concept of that term, they are ready
to strike down the act of Congress.
Proceedings may be instituted by a petition filed either by the debtor corpora-
tion or by three of its creditors who are holders of provable claims in excess of
$1,000, or by an answer filed by the corporation in a pending bankruptcy. The
central jurisdictional fact which must be alleged is that the corporation is in-
solvent or unable to meet its debts as they mature, and that it desires to effect a
plan of reorganization. The district judge with whom the petition is filed must
be satisfied that the proceedings are instituted in good faith. If the petition is
approved, no adjudication in bankruptcy is to be entered. The court acquiresjurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever located for the purpose of
the proceedings. The court may appoint a trustee for the corporation, or continue
the debtor in possession. It may give either the trustee or the debtor authority
to continue the business.
A plan of reorganization is then proposed for the debtor. It may be proposed
by the corporation itself, in which case no prior approval of the plan by any of
its security holders is required. If the plan is proposed by creditors, ten per cent
of all holding claims must have accepted it as a condition of its consideration by
the court. If proposed by stockholders, five per cent of such security holders
must first approve of it. The point to note is that the debtor is favored by
exempting it from the necessity of getting any approval of its plan before it may
be propos.ed to the court.
The plan must provide for the payment of the reorganization expenses. If
the court finds the corporation to be insolvent in the bankruptcy sense (excess of
liabilities over assets at a fair valuation), no provision need be made in the plan
for stockholders. If there is no such finding, the plan must either be accepted by
a majority of each class of stockholders whose interests are adversely affected
thereby; or adequate protection for the realization of the value of the equity of
such class of stock in the debtor's property must be made (a) by a sale of the
property at not less than a fair upset price, or (b) by appraisal and payment in
cash of the value either of their stock, or at the objecting stockholders' election,
of the securities allotted to such stockholders under the plan, or (c) by such
methods as will do substantial justice to such stockholders under the circumstances.
As to creditors, the plan must either be accepted by two-thirds in amount of
each class affected by the plan, or the plan must provide for the payment of their
liens or claims in cash in full; or it must provide adequate protection for the
realization by the creditors of the value of their liens or claims, if the property
affected by their liens or claims is dealt with by the plan. Such provision may
be made (a) by a transfer of such property subject to their liens or claims or the
retention of such property by the debtor subject to such claims, or (b) by a sale
free of their liens or claims at not less than a fair upset price and the transfer of
their claims to the proceeds of the sale, or (c) by appraisal and payment in cash
of the value of their claims or liens, or, at the objecting creditors' election, of the
securities allotted to them under the plan; or (d) by such method as will in the
opinion of-the judge equitably provide protection for them under the circumstances.
The trustee or debtor is authorized to issue certificates in exchange for cash
for operating expenses, which may have priority over any existing indebtedness,
secured or unsecured. After hearing such objections as may be made to thie plan,
the judge is authorized to confirm it if satisfied that (1) it is fair and equitable,
(2) that it does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors or
stockholders, (3) that it is feasible, and (4) that it complies with the provisions
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The Constitution of the United States confers upon Congress the power
"To establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies through-
out the United States". 6 It is well known that two rival theories of
interpretation of constitutional provisions exist and are employed by the
courts. One would apply the precise meaning of the words as of the time
of the adoption of the clause in question. The other would leave it to each
generation to work out for itself the scope of the constitutional immunity. 7
No stronger example of the consistent application of the latter theory could
be found than in the history of bankruptcy legislation. The concept of
bankruptcy has not merely been an expanding one since 1789. It has
radically altered.
I should not deny that the solution of a major economic or social prob-
lem is not to be sought by tracing a concept among its ancient origins. It is
by the ethics of the consequences of acts, including legislative enactments,
and not by the ethics of antecedent concepts, that their existence must be
justified. However, I believe that it will be profitable to examine briefly
the history of bankruptcy legislation for the light which that history throws
upon the conception of the function of a bankruptcy statute in the economy
of here and now. In Anglo-American law the first bankruptcy act appeared
in 1542.9 Its title is: "An act against such persons as do make bankrupts."
It was exactly that. It was aimed "against" fraudulent debtors only.10 It
was limited to traders and merchants; no discharge of the debtor from his
debts was provided; no voluntary petition could be filed. Obviously it was
an act passed in aid of creditors only; there was no thought of making any
provision "for the relief of debtors". In 1705 under the reign of Queen
Anne a provision was added granting a very limited discharge." Thus the
English law stood at the time of the adoption of the United States Constitu-
tion. The first American act was enacted in 1800.12 It seems identical in
theory with the English law of Henry VIII. It too was aimed at fraudulent
of the act as to acceptance by security holders or provision for their interest is
otherwise made as outlined above. All amounts to be paid as consideration by
the debtor or any corporation acquiring the assets of the debtor as compensation
to the reorganization managers or committee must be fully disclosed and found
to be reasonable. Special relief from taxing statutes and dispensation from com-
pliance with the Securities Act of 1933 are afforded to the debtor corporation.
Then follows the provisions (Section 77B(g)) quoted at the beginning of this
article, by which the plan is made binding upon all security holders of the
corporation, whether or not they have accepted it. Upon such confirmation of
the plan by final decree of the court, the debtor is discharged from all of its debts
and liabilities except as specifically reserved in the decree defining the relative
rights and privileges of creditors and stockholders in the new or reorganized
corporation. In all the provisions of the amending section, the corporation is
referred to as a "debtor", not as a "bankrupt". Section 77A provides that the
federal courts shall exercise additional jurisdiction "for the relief of debtors" as
provided in Section 77B.
8 Morford and Stebbins, loc. cit., supra note 3.
6 Article I, Section 8, Clause 4.
7The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Case (Home Building & Loan Asso-
ciation v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934)), is an example of the cleavage produced
by these theories. The majority opinion in that case adopted the dynamic theory;
the minority the static.
9 34 and 35 Henry VIII, c. 4.
10 The preamble of the act is significant in this connection. It reads:
"Whereas divers and sundry persons craftily obtaining into their hands great
substance of other men's goods, do suddenly flee to parts unknown, or keep their
houses, not minding to pay or restore to any of the creditors, their debts and
duties, but at their own wills and pleasures consume the substance obtained, by
credit, of other men, for their own pleasure and delicate living, against all reason,
equity and good conscience: Be it enacted
11 4 Anne c. 17.
12 The Act of April 4, 1800, 2 Stat. 19.
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debtors; limited to traders and merchants. Any extension beyond this scope
to other debtors was assumed to be unconstitutional. No voluntary petition
was provided for. A discharge could be had, but only by consent of two-
thirds of the creditors in number and amount. In practice the discharge
was an incident granted only in the rarest cases. It is again apparent that
this was legislation solely in aid of creditors. The law was repealed in 1802.
When the panic of 1837 spread itself over the country there was no
national bankruptcy law. A special session of Congress was called in 1841
to relieve economic distress. From that Congress there emerged a new
conception of bankruptcy. The Act of 184113 provided for voluntary peti-
tions; extended eligibility beyond the old limit of traders and merchants
only to all debtors; and it eliminated, practically speaking, the necessity of
creditor consent for a discharge. What is significant here is that a device,
bankruptcy, which at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was solely
one for the protection of creditors, has become dominantly a measure for
the relief of debtors. It is one of the striking examples of the ability of
the Anglo-American legal system to infuse old forms with a new content;
to give expression to "the felt necessities of the times" even though the
validity of the legislation which did so depended upon a reinterpretation of
constitutional powers in terms of an existing need. 'The Act of 1841 was
attacked as unconstitutional by Senator Benton on the ground that it was
not a law on the subject of bankruptcies. 14 On the static theory of inter-
pretation the act clearly was unconstitutional. It was an act primarily for
the relief of debtors. Bankruptcy in 1789 was a device for the benefit of
creditors only; nothing more. The constitutionality of the act was upheld,
however, when challenged in the courts.' 5 This fundamental shift in the
concept of the term bankruptcy has remained in subsequent legislation.
Until the 1933 amendments appeared, only two changes material here were
made subsequent to 1841. An amendment to the 1877 act enacted in 1874
provided for compositions between debtors and their creditors. There was
no reference to "bankrupts" in the section, but to "debtors". Such a com-
position could be confirmed if accepted by creditors holding a majority of
the claims. In that case, it was binding upon the minority. The significance
of the statute is its evidence of further indulgence toward the debtor. The
constitutionality of this statute was sustained in In re Reiman.'(
The present law was enacted in 1898.17 Again the debtor was extended
greater favors than ever before. The powers of creditors to file bankruptcy
petitions against their debtors were drastically circumscribed. But the far-
reaching alteration made in the law in aid of the debtor was the enactment
of a new definition of insolvency,' 8 sui generis in the world. The common
law definition of bankruptcy was suspension of payments.' 0 It is the Eng-
lish, the Canadian, and the Continental definition even today.20 The defini-
tion of bankruptcy in the act of 1867 was inability to meet maturing
obligations.21 During the panic of 1873 this test resulted in many honest
13 3 Stat. 440 (1841).
14 Senate Document No. 65, 72nd Congress, 1st Session, at p. 51.
15 In re Klein, decided in the 8th circuit court, and, by direction of the United
States Supreme Court, printed "as being of general interest" in 42 U. S. (1 How-
ard) 277 (1843).
16 Fed. Cas. No. 11, 673 (D. C.) and 11,675 (C. C.) (1875).
17 28 U. S. C. A.
18 Excess of liabilities over assets at a fair valuation. Bankruptcy Act,
Section 1(15).
19 McGill v. Comm. Credit Co., 243 Fed. 637, 646 (D. C. Md., 1917).
20 Collier: Bankruptcy (2d, ed., 1931), page 13. C. C. H., Bankruptcy Law
Service, page 151.
21 Pirie v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438, 450, 21 S. Ct. 906 (1901).
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debtors being thrown into bankruptcy who might have paid their debts had
their creditors shown a little patience. The purpose of the change of defini-
tion in 1898 then appears again to be in aid of the debtor; to prevent the
recurrence of the treatment which debtors received at the hands of their
creditors in 1873. The constitutionality of the 1898 act was sustained in
IIanover National Bank v. Moyses.22
In the light of this review of bankruptcy legislation the objections to
the constitutionality of Sec. 77B on the ground that it is not bankruptcy
would seem to disappear. Evidently a bankruptcy law is no more than an
act providing for the adjustment of the relation between a debtor who is
unable to meet his obligations, and his creditor. Anything else is but a
means to this end. A sale and immediate distribution of the property is one
means of such adjustment. It involves liquidation, a synonym for sacrifice.
A distribution 'of the corporate debtor's property by the issuance of securi-
ties to those holding an interest in that property, bondholders, creditors, and
stockholders, is another means.2 3 It is probably a better means because it
does not involve liquidation. If the creditor wants cash at once, he is free
to sell his security.
In declaring that a debtor "unable to meet its debts as they mature"
should be eligible to relief under Section 77B Congress simply reenacted the
definition of a bankrupt adopted in its three previous acts, the common law
definition, and the definition universally followed in the legislation of the
world. It seems frivolous to assert that Congress has not the power to do
this now because it adopted another definition at one time.2 4
As for the contention that a bankruptcy law may not deal with the rela-
tion of stockholders among themselves, it would seem a complete answer
to say that a bankruptcy law may constitutionally deal with the stockholders'
rights when an adjustment of those rights is necessarily incidental to an
exercise of its constitutional power to adjust the relation between debtor
and creditor. An analogy is furnished in the power of Congress to control
intra-state affairs whenever such control is necessary to the effective exercise
of its power over interstate commerce.2 5 And as for the contention that
no bankruptcy law has heretofore attempted to affect the secured creditors'
lien, the short answer is that the statement is not accurate. The fact is
that prior to the 1933 amendments Congress had dealt with the lien to the
extent of allowing the property of a bankrupt to be sold free of the lien,
remitting the lien to the proceeds of the sale. The creditor is vitally affected
by such a procedure since he must be watchful to protect his lien at the
sale, or otherwise possibly see it divested for a song.
Before 77B
The history of bankruptcy legislation is interesting history. But it has
not been set out here because it is interesting. Its significance to the present
discussion has already been indicated. It shows in an arresting manner the
22 186 U. S. 181 (1901).
23 We are not at this point concerned with what is a fair adjustment of the
interests of bondholder, creditor, and stockholder in the reorganized company.
24 The courts have already answered this objection, made to a former act.
In In re Klein, loc. cit, supra note 15, Mr. Justice Catron said that any law is "a
bankruptcy law in substance and fact, that causes to be distributed by a tribunal the
property of a debtor among his creditors . . . Such a law may be denominated
an insolvent law (and never mention the words 'bankruptcy' or 'bankrupt'); still
it deals directly with the subject of bankruptcies, and is a bankrupt law, in the
sense of the Constitution. .
25 Shreveport Rate Cases (1914), 234 U. S. 342; Wisconsin Rate Case (1922),
257 U. S. 563.
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progress of legislative value judgments in the bankruptcy field. For three
hundred years of Anglo-American law26 bafikruptcy was a device solely for
the benefit of creditors. Beginning nearly a century ago the concept of
bankruptcy altered to become dominantly remedial legislation for debtors.
The subsequent'acts of 1874 and 1898 not only preserved the altered concept
but, as already shown, carried it further. The 1933 amendments 27 carried
the notion of indulgence toward the debtor further yet. They are in pari
materia so that an understanding of the significance of all conditions the
meaning of each. Section 74 grants relief to individual debtors by way of
composition who are unable to meet their debts as they mature. Section 75
provides similar legislation adapted to the special problems of farmers.
Section 77 is the railroad reorganization provision, almost identical, so far
as the problems involved in this discussion are concerned, with Sec. 77B.
It is evident therefore that Congress in enacting these Acts for debtor
relief did not accept as its standard an historic concept. It had in mind the
genesis of the need, the condition out of which the demand for the legisla-
tion arose. Inevitably the amending sections embodied a philosophy of values.
An understanding of this philosophy requires a review of the system which
section 77B was designed to supplant.
In the first place the Act recognizes that American corporate activities
are national in scope, and that judicial machinery must be accommodated to
deal with its problems as a national unit. The possibilities of the utter
dissolution of a corporate venture and the dissipation of its going-concern
value by the appointment of State-court receivers for it in as many States
as the company does business are well known. The danger was the more
formidable because of the opportunity it offered to the merely unscrupulous
creditor or his lawyer who instituted the action merely that he might per-
sonally profit in some administrative capacity by the legal ritual of dissolu-
tion. Prior to Section 77B the corporation's only protection against this
possibility was vigilant action in its own behalf. Even though it were not
insolvent in the present bankruptcy sense, if it felt itself open to the danger
indicated, its only safe course was to arrange for an equity receivership
before the sheriff could reach its door. A friendly suit in equity was
instituted. The debtor corporation selected as plaintiff for the suit in which
it was to be defendant, one of its simple contract creditors, an individual or
corporation domiciled in a state other than its own. Suit could then be
instituted in the federal court of the debtor's domicile. The theory of the
action was that plaintiff was suing in behalf of himself and all creditors of
the debtor for equitable execution; for the preservation of the corporation's
assets for the benefit of all creditors; and for the sale of the debtor's prop-
erty and ratable distribution according to the respective equities of its
creditors. A receiver of the corporation was asked in the bill. The debtor
answered, admitting the allegations of the petition, and joining in the prayer
for the appointment of a receiver. Prima facie this procedure seems col-
lusive. But it was the best that could be done under the circumstances, and
was specifically approved by the United States Supreme Court.28
But since the jurisdiction of the receiver did not extend beyond the limits
of the district of the federal court which made the appointment, in the
26 From the act of Henry VIII in 1542, loc. cit., supra note 9, until the United
States Act of 1841, loc. cit., supra note 13. Historical parallel is shown in England
where voluntary petitions were allowed by statute of 1849, 12 and 13 Vict., c. 106.
27 Sections 73, 74, 75, 77, and Section 77B, although enacted in 1934, is properly
a part of this group. It was introduced with the other sections but caught in the
last minute legislative jam of the 72nd Congress, and not passed until the 73rd.
28 Re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U. S. 90 (1908).
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case of an ordinary business corporation, it was necessary to appoint ancil-
lary receivers in each federal court sitting in a district where the corpora-
tion conducted any of its activities. Almost invariably this meant a different
receiver for each judicial district. In the meantime creditors of the com-
pany would have formed committees, or at least one committee composed
of those creditors and representatives of the management who had fostered
the equity receivership. This committee proceeded to work out a plan of
reorganization (the plan might be full grown even before the equity pro-
ceeding were begun). Deposits of securities with the committee were
actively sought from all creditors, and such deposits were generally obtained
by the "reorganization committee", because most creditors favor continuance
of a business on the ground that they will stand a much better chance to
realize on their security from the reorganized company than by a liquidation
of the assets of the reorganizing company. It is not unusual for such a
committee to receive a deposit of eighty per cent of all outstanding bonds.
Under the equity practice, the plan of reorganization was then submitted to
the court for its approval, and the court gave it at least such cursory con-
sideration before proceeding with the sale. A sale was thought necessary
for the reason already indicated. It was quite generally supposed that the
security holder's contract right to insist upon such a sale and the receipt of
his pro rata share of its proceeds could not be disregarded without his con-
sent. It goes without saying that unanimous consent of a great group of
security holders was never obtainable. So that a sale of the property was
held, on foreclosure of the corporate mortgage.
A mind trained in the common law tradition instinctively looks at such
a situation through the spectacles of analogies familiar to him. On its face
the foreclosure of an ordinary mortgage on a house and lot or small store
building seems to be similar. In fact there are essential differences. A
foreclosure "sale" of the assets of a large corporation when realistically
viewed is not a "sale" at all. It is but a step in the reorganization proceed-
ings, carefully worked out and rehearsed beforehand by the reorganization
committee. Since the creditor may apply his debt at par toward payment
of his bid at a sale on foreclosure or execution, no one was in a position to
bid against the reorganization committee holding a substantial percentage
of the bonds. The committee's bid was satisfied by signing a receipt and
putting up a relatively small amount of cash. A competitive bidder on most
such sales would have to appear with $15,000,000 in cash or more (depend-
ing, of course, upon the size of the business). Did you ever know a banker
who would lend you $15,000,000 upon the security of a business which had
just demonstrated that it couldn't make the grade, in order that you might
bid at such a sale? No competitive bidder ever appeared.2 9
This awkward procedure did finally result in the reorganization of the
debtor corporation. But it had many serious disadvantages. Everyone
knows that receivership is an expensive luxury. The receiver's fee and his
attorney's fee took sizeable percentages of the corporate income. It was
not unusual that this drain should continue as long as five years before
reorganization should be accomplished. 30 But far worse was the extrav-
agance and inefficiency necessarily involved in ancillary receivership. In a
recent chain store equity proceeding, some fifty ancillary receivers were
29 These are facts of common knowledge among persons acquainted with the
mechanics of equity reorganization. Judicial notice of the fact that no competitive
bidder ever appears was taken by the United States Supreme Court in Louisville
Trust Co. v. Louisville Ry. Co., 174 U. S. 674, 19 S. Ct. 827 (1899).
30 The Pittsburgh, Shawmut and Northern Ry. Co. has been in receivership
continuously since 1905.
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appointed in the various federal courts for the one company. Each receiver
supreme boss in his own district. Fifty receivers' fees; fifty attorneys' fees.
Not small fees either. The good will and going-concern value of the com-
pany inevitably suffered. "It's in receivership" is no complimentary tag for
a corporation, even if its financial condition is fundamentally sound and
resort is had to such proceedings merely as a protective device. The fore-
closure sale was another great expense; the organization of the new com-
pany, the printing and engraving of its securities and charter a further
drain. Designing creditors might muddle the whole situation by beginning a
bankruptcy proceeding, solely to force the debtor corporation to buy peace
from them. Corporations which really needed reorganization held off from
the equity method as long as possible because of these enormous hardships
which the procedure entailed. The Supreme Court of the United States
added to the unattractiveness of the device as a reorganization medium, just
before its usefulness was to expire by the enactment of Section 77B, by
questioning the availability of such proceedings for the reorganization of
any corporation other than a public utility.3 1
Due Process and the Dissenter
The disadvantages of reorganization in equity which have been outlined
were serious enough. But a still greater one existed. That problem was
how to deal with the dissenting security holder. It was a delicate one for
the courts. It is probably not unfair to say that no matter how equitable
the reorganization plan which was proposed, some recalcitrant security
holders took advantage of the situation to force the payment of more than
their fair share in the underlying properties of the debtor corporation. In
the eyes of the reorganization committee the dissenter was almost invariably
such a person. But to the court which had to pass upon the fairness of
the reorganization plan, he was the holder of a contract-a property right-
calling for the sale of the corporate debtor's property and a distribution to
him of his pro rata share of its proceeds.32 Due pr"ocess of law, it was
assumed, compelled this result.3 3  And so a sale was ordered. To afford
some semblance of protection for the dissenting creditor's interest in the
proceeds of such a sale, the courts of equity developed the practice of setting
an upset (minimum) price which the property must bring at the public
outcry. If such a price were fixed at the fair value of the property, and the
corporate assets on the sale sold for such sum, the creditor would receive
the precise percentage of the proceeds of the sale to which he was entitled.
But we have already seen that there could be and was only one bidder at
every such sale. He could name his own price. Not only that, he could
31 First National Bank v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504 (1934); Shapiro v. Wilgus,
287 U. S. 348 (1922); Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36 (1928).
32The following statement by Justice Brewer is typical: "A party insisting
upon those rights is probably, or even certainly, bound to suffer loss, yet while he
insists it (the court) must protect him in his insistence. There is no wide discre-
tion vested in the chancellor which permits him to disturb contract rights-rights
of property". Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago Rys. Co. (C. C. A), 118
Fed. 923, 927. In the case of In re Prudential Outfitting Company of Delaware,
Inc. (1818), 250 Fed. 504 (D. C., S. D. N. Y.), judge Learned Hand said: "The
dissenting creditors must be paid in cash their own proportion of the bid which is
their inviolate right. A bankruptcy court under no circumstances will, or indeed,
can compel creditors to accept an aliquot interest in the assets of the bankrupt
under the guise of a sale."
33 Cutcheon: An Examination of Devices Employed to Obviate the Embar-
rassments to Reorganizations Created by the B6yd Case (1930) in Some Legal
Phases of Corporate Financing, Reorganization and Regulation, page 70 et seq.;
Harding v. Amer. Sumatra Tob. Co., 14 Fed. (2d) 168 (D. C., N. D. Ga., 1926).
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION UNDER BANKRUPTCY ACT 395
name his own upset price, since it would be futile for the court to fix any
figure except one which the reorganization committee would be able and
willing to pay. Realistically, therefore, the upset price is not calculated
by the judge in equity chambers; it is arrived at in the lawyer's office. 34
It must include cash enough to pay all the reorganization expense, no small
item. Some cash in addition is thrown in for the dissenters. Counsel are
careful to see that it is substantially less than -what would probably be the
value of the security which the dissenter declines and the majority have
accepted. As a matter of fact the cash which the dissenter got by this
process was but a dribble. 35
And this was due process for the dissenter. He had destroyed his rights
by insisting upon his rights. One is inclined at first to reproach the chan-
cellor for not affording him better protection. The answer is "the limits of
effective legal action". 36  For one who insisted upon a sale, equity could not
be asked to produce a purchaser with millions in his pocket, ready and willing
to bid in competition with the reorganization committee for the assets of
the old company. But nothing short of that would serve to infuse a judicial
sale of an enormous corporate property with any meaning.
We are now in a position to view Section 77B in its true perspective.
If the security holder is a member of a class of creditors two-thirds of
whom have accepted the reorganization plan, he must go along; his right to
insist upon a sale and distribution of his interest in cash is gone. If he is
-a stockholder, a majority vote will bind him. He may protest that the plan
is unfair, even though accepted by the requisite majorities. Can he say that
it deprives him of due process of law? Again the final answer must be
furnished by one's philosophy of values. But the analysis of conditions
before the enactment of Section 77B has served this purpose. One who
should contend that the plan as applied is unconstitutional because it deprives
the creditor of his "inviolate property right" to insist upon a sale of the
debtor's property, denies the power of Congress to legislate in the public
interest 37 if, incidentally to the promotion of that end, a "right" which has
no substantial value whatever is extinguished. The dissenter has a "right"
to cash in the sense of a metaphysical concept. Not in the sense that the
right is of substantial value to him. It was competent for Congress to rec-
ognize this fact. Section 77B takes the realistic view that the dissenter may
constitutionally be deprived of this nothingness. In its place it gives him
34 Lest this appear to be too baldly realistic, I may say that the ritual was for
the judge to set the upset price upon the advice of the receiver. But the receiver
in turn almost invariably cooperated with the reorganization committee and its
counsel, learned from them their top bid price, which was then passed up through
the receiver to the judge and appeared in the decree as the upset price.
35 To one not acquainted with corporate reorganization practice, this statement
may appear startling. But all commentators on the subject agree that it is no
exaggeration. Louis B. Whele (Railroad Reorganization Under Section 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act, 44 Yale L. J. 197, December, 1934) depreciates the coercive
power of legislation of the type of Section 77B over the dissenter. He admits,
however, that equity's attempts for the last 50 years to obtain substantial cash
for the dissenter have been fruitless. This at page 114.
30 The case of Phipps v. Chi., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (C. C. A. 8th, 1922), 284
Fed. 945, in which the court refused a sale and insisted upon protecting the
dissenter against himself by offering him only preferred stock in the reorganized
company, is famous mostly because of this unique treatment of the dissenter.
Ninety-five per cent of creditors and 99 per cent of stockholders had accepted this
arrangement. But certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United
States, and counsel for the railroad company, possibly fearing a reversal there,
settled with the dissenter. The case was generally criticized, and no subsequent
decision followed the practice.
37 The interest of the general public in Section 77B is discussed below.
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such securities in the reorganized company as his brother shareholders have
agreed to accept. It will be a rare case in which these are not marketable
for cash, if cash is his great concern.
Assume that a plan of reorganization under Section 77B provides for an
exchange of securities only. It is submitted to the court and approved.
Two-thirds of the creditors and a majority of stockholders have accepted it.
Others refuse. They insist upon cash for their interests. If they constitute
a sizeable percentage, say the other one-third of creditors and forty-five per
cent of the stockholders, it is very likely that they could frustrate the pro-
ceeding, if it were in equity reorganization. The result there would be
liquidation. Liquidation prices for enormous business properties, as every-
one knows, are scrap prices. But if liquidation proceeds, ultimately the
recalcitrants will receive their pro rata portion of the proceeds of such a
sale. Had they accepted the reorganization plan, it is almost a certainty
that the security which they would have received from the reorganized,
going-concern, in exchange for that which they held in the former company,
would have been saleable at a greater sum than each realized through the
liquidation sale. In this situation, Section 77B protects the security holder
against himself by forcing the reorganization plan's offering upon him. If
it be said that the dissenter does not favor liquidation to reorganization, but
only wants fair treatment under a fair plan, I think it is an answer to say
that he is to receive exactly the same treatment as those security holders of
his class who think the plan is reasonable and who have accepted it; that a
majority favor the plan; that orthodox corporation law has for decades made
possible corporate action of vast importance to all security holders by vote
of a majority of the shareholders; and that the federal court has examined
the plan and found it fair. By the traditional common law machinery for
determining fairness-the vote of a majority of his peers, and the finding of
a judicial tribunal-the plan may be said to grant the dissenter equitable
treatment. Logically he is forced, then, to the contention that no plan of
reorganization, even though it may have been objectively found to be fair,
may constitutionally deprive him of his "inviolate contract right" to insist
upon a sale. The argument comes round to one depending for its answer
upon our philosophy of values. There is, of course, something to be said
for the theory that contract rights should be maintained unimpaired. What
value judgment did Congress regard of paramount importance to this one?
Bankruptcy and the Public Interest
Jerome Frank fears that Section 77 (which is substantially identical with
Sec. 77B so far as the points here discussed are concerned) may operate to
give the bondholders an undue advantage over the stockholders. 38  Louis B.
Wehle believes that Section 77 gives the stockholders such an unjustifiable
advantage over the bondholders as to create a serious question of the consti-
tutionality of the law.3 9 Each treats of the amending section as if its sole
aim were to furnish a vehicle for the adjustment of the relative claims of
the security holders among themselves; the one from the view of the anxious
stockholder, the other from that of the more anxious bondholder. I profess
to see in Section 77B something more, to which the provisions looking to
the adjustment of security holders relative claims are secondary. The in-
clusion of a review of the history of Anglo-American bankruptcy legislation
in this paper has been pointless unless it has induced a conviction that for
38 Frank: Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reor-
ganization, (1933) 19 Virginia L. R. 541, 698, at page 709.
39 Loc. cit., supra note 35, at p. 231.
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the last century bankruptcy has been dominantly a device intended for the
relief of debtors. And not only has that concept of bankruptcy obtained,
but every single bankruptcy amendment, at present day, has been more
liberal to the debtor than the last. Whatever one may think of the Frazier-
Lemke bill, 40 the last of all, it is unquestionably more indulgent than any
other ever enacted. The significance of this trend to the present discussion
is apparent. To me it seems that the dominant intent of Congress in the
enactment of Sec. 77B was not to provide a vehicle for the adjustment of
interests between security holders; it was to afford relief to the corporate
debtor itself as a unit distinct from those who are interested in it as
investors; to lessen the impact of the fixed charges upon the corporate
income; to enable the corporation thereby to continue to live and perform its
function as a vital unit in the economic organization of society today, rather
than to be liquidated at a frightful social and economic loss to the community
which it serves.
Text books and cases on corporation law are abundantly filled with dis-
cussions of the reality or non-reality of corporate existence distinct from the
shareholders. This paper will not enter the realm of that dispute. But a
sense of realism, I believe, compels the conclusion that in so far as Sec.
77B deals with the debtor corporation, it deals with it upon the basis of an
economic and social unit distinct from its security holders. A corporation
is an employer of labor. In thousands of communities in the United States
it is the most important economic unit present there. Upon its continuity
of operation the economic and social destiny of the major portion of that
community depends. Short of an act of God, no greater calamity could
befall such a community than the liquidation of the business and the dis-
mantlement of the primary source of employment for that district.
I should like to make the point by an example of a corporation now in
reorganization under Sec. 77B. It is The Studebaker Corporation, an auto-
mobile manufacturing company, the makers of "Studebaker" cars. Most
of its manufacturing activities are carried on at South Bend, Indiana, a city
of a hundred thousand people. It is virtually the only industry in that city.
It has 9,882 employees; 881 preferred stockholders; 37,452 common stock-
holders.4 ' The corporation, and predecessor companies, had a long and
profitable business record until the coming of the present economic decline.
A few years ago, during the "new era" financing, it issued nearly $15,000,000
of ten year 6% notes. The default on these is the occasion for the present
reorganization. The last available statement of financial condition 42 showed
total assets of the company of $85,000,000, more than three-fourths of which
was represented by investment in land and factory buildings. Working
capital is utterly inadequate. A plan of reorganization has been proposed
and already accepted by two-thirds of the creditors. Inevitably some will
not come in. But under Sec. 77B these dissenting creditors can now be
bound by the plan and permit the reorganization of this company.
Had it not been for the new legislation it is not unreasonable to suppose
that reorganization of this corporation would have been impossible. Apart
from the strain of expense on the corporation which would have been en-
tailed by an equity receivership proceeding, it does not seem likely that cash
could be raised at this time to buy out dissenting creditors. As we have
seen, some cash always had to be supplied for this purpose, in an equity
40 Bankruptcy Act, Section 75(s), 11 U. S. C. A: No. 203(s), approved
June 28th, 1934.
41As of 5-1-34. Moody's Industrials, 1934, Addenda, p. 3338.
42As of September 30, 1934. Standard Corporation Records, Vol. 12, No.
2533, No. 6.
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reorganization. The alternative was liquidation. What this would mean
for the employees of Studebaker and for the city of South Bend can be
imagined. If the plant were dismantled, nearly ten thousand employees'
families would lose their means of support; property values in the city would
not recover for fifty years. If the federal court makes the plan of reorgan-
ization of The Studebaker Corporation under Sec. 77B binding on those
creditors of the company, less than one-third, who have not accepted the
plan, will it deprive them without due process of law of their "inviolate
property right" to insist upon a sale of the assets of the company? I agree
that the enormity of the public need is not the measure of the power of
Congress. But the presence of that need is a consideration not to be over-
looked in determining whether a power, conceded to exist, is reasonably
exercised by a statute which seeks to preserve vital economic and social
interests from dissolution. 48 If this is an adequate analysis, there would
seem to be only one answer to the contention that Sec. 77B is not due
process of law.
If further support for the contention that the dominant purpose of Sec.
77B is to aid the debtor corporation itself to avoid liquidation by reorganiza-
tion were needed, it may be found on the face of the act itself.44 Proceed-
ings may be instituted by the debtor corporation itself. The debtor may be
continued in possession without the appointment of a trustee, and authorized
to continue the business. The debtor may propose a plan of reorganization
in its own behalf without first securing the consent of some security holders,
whereas if the latter propose a plan, it must first be accepted by a substantial
percentage of the corporation's investors. The trustee or debtor is author-
ized to issue certificates in exchange for cash with priority over any existing
liens in order to obtain money to continue the business. Reorganization
expenses, including compensation of committees, which are borne by the
debtor, are limited to such amounts as are found to be reasonable by the
court. Special relief from taxing statutes and dispensation from compliance
with the Securities Act of 1933 are afforded to the debtor corporation. And,
strongest of all, is the provision that the debtor may effect reorganization by
a plan accepted by only two-thirds of creditors and a majority of stock-
holders, relieving it of the former burden of buying off dissenters. When
so accepted the plan is binding and the debtor discharged from all its obli-
gations except as provided in the reorganization decree.
If my view as to the value judgment which Congress considered the
dominant one in the enactment of Sec.'77B is the correct one, I believe it
will go far to furnish the solution of the question whether a plan of reor-
ganization under the statute provides a reasonable adjustment. of the relative
claims of security holders among themselves. I do not deny that the
adjustment of such interests is an important function of the statute. But
I believe that we must approach the conference table for such an adjustment
bearing in mind that Congress intended that the dominant purpose of its
enactment-to insure the continuance of the corporate enterprise-should
have an impact upon our deliberation. I submit as a direct contact between
the two interests the financial pages of the daily newspapers which inform
us from time to time that a certain company has laid off several thousand
employees in order that current income may be used to keep the "bond-
budget" intact.
43 It is submitted that this statement is a reasonable interpretation of the
effect of Nebbia v. NeW York (1934), 54 S. Ct. 510.
44 If both the debtor corporation and some of its creditors institute proceed-
ings under Section 77B, the debtor's petition will be preferred, if diligently filed,
even though its petition were not the first one filed. In re National Dept. Stores,
8 Fed. Supp. 19 (September, 1934).
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It is a commonplace now to observe that property is not an absolute;
that it is but a bundle of equities or legal expectations. The state confers
them and may, within reasonable limits, alter them from time to time.
What those reasonable limits are is determined, by and large, upon the
basis of the economic and social need. The economic philosophy of Section
77B is continuity of corporate enterprise. An almost indispensable factor
in such continuity is the corporate management. And the corporation man-
agement, as everyone knows, is invariably associated with the stockholders
group rather than the bondholders. If the corporation is to continue, the
management must continue with it. Furthermore, some cash must be ad-
vanced even under Section 77B, in order to meet the reorganization expense,
and generally to provide immediate working capital. Past experience with
reorganization has demonstrated that it is only the stockholders who are
willing to come forward with this fresh money. Surely it was competent for
Congress to recognize these facts; and to provide that in the adjustment of
the conflict of interest between bondholders and stockholders the absolute
priority rights of bondholders under their contracts should be to some extent
disregarded to the advantage of the stockholders, in order that the latter
would have an incentive to stand by the business and furnish the new cash,
rather than to let the enterprise die. If we remember that the pervading
purpose of the act is to preserve the life of the company, such an adjustment
of conflicting interests seems a reasonable exercise of the power of Con-
gress. If we do not see such a dominant scheme in the statute, but discuss
it simply from the standpoint of the relative rights of stockholders and bond-
holders in the corporate debtor's property, as did Wehle,4 5 then I should
concede that a plan of reorganization which gives stockholders an interest in
the new company based solely upon their supposed equity in the old, when
the interest of bondholders has not been recognized in full, presents a more
serious question of the constitutionality of the statute.
Wehle's approach to the adjustment of the relation of stockholders' and
bondholders' interests in the debtor's property is evidently from the angle of
how the act will affect the interests of the bondholders. His point of de-
parture is the "trust fund principle". His theory is that equity regards the
corporate debtor's property as a trust fund for the benefit of creditors, out
of which they are entitled to recognition of their claims in full before stock-
holders may claim any interest in such property. The practice in equity
receivership was then to proceed with a sale of the debtor's property and to
divide the proceeds, either in the form of cash or securities in the new
company. Stockholders were disregarded entirely except to the extent that
they contributed cash for the new enterprise. The amending section, by
requiring that stockholders be dealt with in any plan of reorganization unless
the court find that the debtor is "insolvent" (virtually an impossibility in
dealing with a vast business enterprise), practically means that the equity
security holders must be dealt with in every case. The result is to give
stockholders a new weapon against the trust fund principle. To that extent,
he concludes, valuable property rights which under the old practice of equity
reorganization were shared wholly by the bondholders, must now be divided
with the stockholders. Hence there is a taking of the bondholders' prop-
erty (and a giving of that property to the stockholder), Wehle concludes,
as a result of the amending section.
In the first place, it may be questioned whether his trust fund premise
is based upon an adequate analysis. The trust fund theory in general as
applied to corporate assets has been very much criticized. By the present
weight of authority the trust fund doctrine has no application except on
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the dissolution of a corporation. 46 Section 77B is designed to avoid dis-
solution. It is submitted that the trust fund doctrine has no proper applica-
tion to the reorganization of a corporation unless it means simply that
equity will require the reorganization to be effected with due regard to the
relative claims of all classes of security holders. But the statute in ipsis
verbis requires that. Whether or not a particular plan provides such treat-
ment, it is submitted, will depend in the last analysis upon a consideration
of the theory of the statute which this paper attempts to advance.
But the fundamental weakness of the trust fund analysis, I believe, lies
in the fact that one who argues that it is applicable to the reorganization
of an enormous business unit is betrayed in this instance by the common
law tradition of argument by analogy. The legal theory which underlies
the distribution of the proceeds of a mortgage foreclosure sale of a house
and lot, or small store building, is familiar enough to the common law
lawyer. The "trust fund theory" would at least explain the result. Out
of the sale price, the first money goes to pay the first mortgage to the
satisfaction of that lien in full; the next money to the second mortgage,
and so on. If there is anything over, it goes to the mortgagor as the owner
of the equity. The scheme of such legislation providing for such a sale
is to give the owner only such sum as remains after creditors are paid in
full out of the sale proceeds. Why is this theory adopted? Is it not because
of the belief on the part of the legislature that it will operate to adjust the
relative rights of the parties in the property fairly and equitably? It is
assumed, and properly so, I believe, that the property will sell upon com-
petitive bidding, or at least where such bidding is reasonably possible; as
a result, it will sell for a figure having a reasonable relation to its fair value.
Since that safeguard is present, the interest of the owner of the property
is protected as well as the interest of the lienholder. When equity came
to deal with a foreclosure of the property of a vast corporate enterprise it
was not unusual that it should have carried over into this field the theories
of liquidation of small property interests. A sale of the corporate assets
was held. The proceeds were distributed in accordance with absolute
priorities of the lien creditors. But it is apparent from what has already
been said, that this process differs fundamentally from the foreclosure of
a lien on a small property. In the corporate foreclosure the interest of the
owners of the equity in the property is divested by a device which furnishes
no assurance, practically speaking, that the property will sell for a sum
which bears a reasonable relation to its worth. We have seen that in fact
it sells for such sum as a committee of creditors wish to bid for it. Had
it sold for its fair value, in most cases there would be something to dis-
tribute to this class of junior security holders.4 7
Congress could not provide a purchaser at these sales who would bid the
fair value of the property. But it is submitted that it could take a realistic
45 Loc. cit., supra note 35. Wehle has made at least one worth-while con-
tribution to the discussion of constitutionality. That is his treatment of the
Gebhard case (Canada Southern Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527 (1883)), which has
often been -cited as supporting the constitutionality of No. 77B, at least by
dictum. This case was one in Conflict of Laws. It was concerned with an
application of the law of Canada. Due process could not therefore have been
involved. And the dictum, itself, as Wehle explains by its context, is equivocal.
46 15 Fletcher: Cyclopedia of Corporations, Sections 7375, 7386; Fogg v. Blair,
133 U. S. 534, 10 S. Ct. 338.
47 In the famous Boyd case (Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482,
33 S. Ct. 554 (1933)), the railroad cost $241,000,000. The lien debts were $157,000,-
000. The road sold on foreclosure for $61,000,000, and the purchaser at once issued$190,000,000 of bonds and $155,000,000 of stock on property which a month before
had been bought for $61,000,000.
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view of foreclosure proceedings of enormous corporate properties; that it
could realize that sales of such properties when no competitive bidders can
possibly appear are but a farce; that to vest title in the lien holders by the
use of such a device really amounts to a deprivation, by the process of law,
of the property interest of the equity security holders in the corporate assets
to the extent that the fair value of those assets exceeds the amount of the
claims against them held by the lienholders who purchase at the fictive sale.
Because foreclosure sale of small mortgaged property will adequately pro-
tect the interests of both debtor and creditor, does this mean that the fore-
closure device is immune from constitutional abolition in a situation where
it does not protect the interest of the equity owners of the property?
Ancient analogies belie the assertion that such a step is not possible. Courts
of equity began three centuries ago to take charge of the incidents of the
contract between borrower and lender in many essentials. The doctrine of
the redemption of mortgaged property after the law day; the rule against
clogging the equity of redemption; usury legislation, are familiar examples.
The theory of such interference was that the necessitous debtor was not free
to bargain. 48 It is submitted that the same theory underlies Section 77B
in according the shareholders a place in reorganization (in any case in which
it is not found that the corporation is insolvent). The law saves for him
what he was powerless to save for himself, his equity in the property. It
does this by providing that a plan of reorganization must provide securities
for the shareholders to the extent of their interest in the assets of the cor-
poration at a fair valuation.
If this is'a correct analysis of the theory underlying the treatment which
Section 77B accords to the stockholders, it would seem that he is not
receiving an undue advantage over the bondholder, but for the first time
in American history a measure of protection has been afforded to safeguard
his interest upon reorganization of his company. In this perspective the
statute is seen as a measure to protect and conserve property; not one
which deprives the creditor of some part of his property without due
process of law. A choice of interests was inevitably presented to Congress.
It chose to enact legislation which would prevent the destruction of the
stockholder's equity upon reorganization. By doing so a measure of prop-
erty values which had formerly gone to the bondholder upon purchase at
the foreclosure sale was lost to him. It would have been no less a choice
had Congress not acted. By its Act, the bondholder lost his windfall; it
was "taken" from him, in a realistic sense; but it was restored to the stock-
holder who in equity was entitled to the interest. It would appear to me
to be within the power of Congress, under the bankruptcy clause, to provide
by legislation for equality of bargaining power between stockholder and
bondholder in the adjustment of their relative rights in the corporate assets
upon reorganization; and that such is the effect of Section 77B.
If my analysis of the theory which underlies the existence of Section 77B
has been adequate, it would seem to me that only one view of its constitu-
tionality may be held. I agree that the existence of a national need does not
create national power. But the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy
legislation is expressly given. Only two questions can therefore arise. Is
the legislation upon the subject of bankruptcies? And does it conform to
the general limits set by due process of law upon Congressional action?
The answer to the first question I have attempted to show by a review of
the expanding concept of bankruptcy, and the alteration of the bankruptcy
48 ". . . necessitous men are not, truly speaking, freemen, but, to answer a
present exigency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon
them." Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden 110, 113 (1762).
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device at the hands of Congress from a creditor's remedy to what is
dominantly a debtor's relief statute. But this history is more significant
to the second question. It demonstrates that the pervading purpose of the
corporate reorganization statute was, in common with the uninterrupted
trend of all bankruptcy amendments, to aid the corporate debtor itself as a
legal entity performing an economic and social function, the continuity of
which is vital to the economy of today. A secondary, though important,
aim of the section was to provide for the adjustment of the relative interests
of stockholders and bondholders in the property of the corporate debtor,
particularly by affording the shareholder a means of preserving his equity
in the corporate assets which the chancellor in an equity reorganization was
powerless to give. The accomplishment of this dominant aim-the con-
tinuance of the debtor in business-is insured by the provisions binding
dissenting security holders to a plan found to be fair by the court and
accepted by the requisite majorities of those who have invested in the com-
pany. It is at this point that Congress was called-upon to write into the
act its philosophy of values. It chose, as we have seen, the value judgment
that the continuity of the corporate enterprise rather than its liquidation
was socially -and economically more desirable than the inviolate maintenance
of the dissenting security holder's right to force a realization upon his claim
in cash-a right which realistically viewed was of no substantial value to
the dissenter but which too often meant the liquidation of the corporate
enterprise. The philosophy of values which the act embodies, the choice
of interests which was made by Congress, would seem to me to be well
within the bounds of due process of law.
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